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I. LIMITED SALES, EXCISE, AND USE TAX
A. Application of Tax
N Geomap Co. v. Bullock' the Austin court of appeals held that maps,
which are a means of disseminating geological information, constitute an
intangible product that is not subject to sales tax.2 Geomap's subscrip-
tion agreements required its customers to make an initial payment for a set
of subsurface geological maps and for use of Geomap's library. The agree-
ments stated that all maps remained the property of Geomap and the cus-
tomer must then return to the company. A second agreement normally
executed with customers provided additional maps and updates of informa-
tion at approximately one-fourth the cost of the initial documents. The dis-
trict court had agreed with the comptroller that Geomap's sales of the
additional maps constituted sales of tangible property subject to sales tax
under section 151.005 of the Tax Code. 3 The appellate court, citing Bullock
v. Statistical Tabulating Corp. ,4 stated that the test for determining the taxa-
bility of the transaction is the "ultimate object or the essence of the transac-
tion." 5 The court then ruled that the additional maps supplied by Geomap
are merely the means for distributing geographical information to custom-
ers.6 The customers are thus actually purchasing information, which is an
intangible product.7
In a case involving similar principles, the comptroller determined that the
essence of a taxpayer's transactions involving rental and servicing of water
conditioning and softening devices constituted the provision of a service
* B.A., Duke University; J.D., University of Texas. Partner, Haynes and Boone, Dal-
las, Texas.
1. 691 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. Id. at 101.
3. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.005 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Although the comptroller
conceded that the initial sale of the subscription agreement did not result in a taxable transac-
tion because it included the provision of services, he argued that the second sale of maps
constituted a taxable sale of tangible property.
4. 549 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex. 1977).
5. 691 S.W.2d at 100 (emphasis in original).
6. Id. at 101.
7. Id. In similar cases the comptroller has ruled that sale of multiple listing books and
sale of negatives or prints by a commercial photographer constitute sales of tangible property.
See Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,110 (1982); Tex. Comptroller's Ad-
ministrative Decision No. 11,925 (1982).
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rather than the rental of equipment.8  In Decision 16,023 the comptroller
examined the type of services rendered by the taxpayer and the degree of
operational control exercised by the taxpayer's customers. 9 The comptroller
concluded that the customers did not exercise the degree of operational con-
trol normally found in a traditional rental, and that the taxpayer provided a
significant amount of services.10
In two decisions the comptroller strictly applied the definition of a sale
under section 151.005 of the Tax Code'1 to certain transactions even though
the taxpayer did not make the sales in the regular course of business and had
no profit motive in the transactions. 12 In Decision 16,69313 a corporation
purchased items by mail-order on behalf of its employees. The corporation
subsequently sold the items to the employees at cost. The comptroller ruled
that the profit motive of the taxpayer is irrelevant. 14 The only important
factor to consider is whether the corporation transferred the goods for con-
sideration.' 5 In Decision 15,95116 a parent corporation leased equipment to
a subsidiary and charged a rental equal to depreciation plus a monthly ser-
vice charge. In this case the subsidiary made no actual lease payments and
the parties failed to execute a formal written lease. The comptroller ruled
that on its face the transaction was subject to sales tax and the taxpayer had
not established any specific exemption for the transaction. 17
In two opinions issued during the Survey period, the attorney general
ruled that the repeal of specific sales tax exemptions did not violate the
United States Constitution. 18 In 1984 the Texas legislature repealed the
sales tax exemption for tangible personal property purchased by a contractor
and used for the improvement of real property belonging to the United
States or an agency or instrumentality of the United States.' 9 In Opinion
No. JM-207 20 the attorney general ruled that section 151.311 of the Tax
Code,2' as amended, does not result in either imposition of a direct tax on
the United States22 or an indirect tax that unconstitutionally discriminates
8. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 16,023 (1985).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.005 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Section 151.005(1) of the Tax
Code provides that a sale includes a "transfer of title or possession of tangible personal prop-
erty . . ." for consideration. Id.
12. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision Nos. 16,693, 15,951 (1985).
13. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 16,693 (1985).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 15,951 (1985).
17. Id.
18. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. Nos. JM-263, JM-207 (1984).
19. Act of July 13, 1984, ch. 31, § 2, 1984 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 462, 551 (Vernon).
20. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-207 (1984).
21. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Tangible personal property
purchased by a contractor for use in the improvement of real property owned by Texas or a
political subdivision of Texas remains exempt.
22. The attorney general acknowledged that Texas may not impose a direct tax upon the
United States or any of its agencies citing Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1943).
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-207 (1984).
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against the United States. 23 Since the statute imposes a tax upon property
used by a contractor, it does not directly impose a tax upon the United
States. Payment of sales tax by such contractors does, however, result in an
indirect imposition of the tax upon the United States because the federal
government bears the burden of the tax. Citing United States v. County of
Fresno,24 the attorney general noted that a state tax is not unconstitutional
merely because it ultimately imposes a burden upon the federal government,
provided that the state imposes such tax equally on other parties similarly
situated. 25 After reviewing a number of United States Supreme Court cases
dealing with the constitutionality of state taxes indirectly imposed upon the
federal government, 26 the attorney general concluded that State of Washing-
ton v. United States27 established the proper test for determining the consti-
tutionality of such a tax.28 In that case the Supreme Court held that no
unconstitutional discrimination exists if the burdens imposed upon the fed-
eral government and its contractors equals the burdens imposed upon pri-
vate enterprise. 29 Although a contractor dealing with the federal
government sustains a different tax burden than one dealing with the State of
Texas, the attorney general concluded that under the Washington test the
Texas sales tax does not unconstitutionally discriminate against the federal
government. 30
The 1984 sales tax legislation also repealed a specific sales tax exemption
for newspapers under section 151.319 of the Tax Code. 3 1 In Opinion No.
JM-263 32 the attorney general concluded that the repeal of this exemption
does not single out newspapers for taxation, but merely imposes upon the
press a tax burden similar to that imposed upon other businesses.33 The
attorney general noted that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
owners of newspapers are not shielded by the first amendment from any of
the ordinary forms of taxation for the support of government. 34
23. Id. An indirect tax may be unconstitutional if it discriminates against the federal gov-
ernment. See United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473 (1958).
24. 429 U.S. 452, 462 (1977).
25. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-207 (1984).
26. The attorney general noted that courts have applied unclear and inconsistent tests
when determining whether discrimination exists. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-207 (1984).
One line of cases established an economic burden test. Under this test the Court invalidated
the tax when it resulted in the imposition of a substantial economic burden upon the govern-
ment. See Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 386-87 (1938); James v.
Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 136 (1937). In other cases the Court applied a legal
incidence test, which turned on whether the interest taxed is that of the federal government or
that of the contractor. See United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 189 (1944);
Trinityfarm Constr. Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.S. 466, 472 (1934).
27. 460 U.S. 536 (1983).
28. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-207 (1984).
29. 460 U.S. at 545-46.
30. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-207 (1984).
31. Act of July 13, 1984, ch. 31, § 3, 1984 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 462 (Vernon); see TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 151.319 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
32. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-263 (1984).
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
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In Decision 13,69931 the comptroller reiterated his position that the Texas
use tax may be imposed upon an aircraft hangared in Texas, even though the
aircraft is used exclusively in interstate transportation. 36 The taxpayer ar-
gued that the commerce clause of the United States Constitution 37 prohib-
ited imposition of the Texas sales and use tax on property used exclusively in
interstate commerce. The comptroller noted, however, that the taxpayer
purchased and moved tangible personal property into Texas from outside
the state for the purpose of retaining it and exercising dominion over it in
Texas. 38 Accordingly, imposition of the Texas use tax does not result in
discrimination against interstate commerce. 39 The tax merely requires that
those engaged in interstate commerce bear their share of the state tax bur-
den.4° The comptroller concluded that if the tax does violate the commerce
clause, the United States Supreme Court should inform Texas of such
violation.41
B. Specific Exemptions
In a second significant sales and use tax case the Austin court of appeals
determined that the legislature intended to impose a sales tax at some point
on the sale of all returnable or non-returnable containers. 42 The taxpayer
argued that its purchase of returnable containers fell within the sale for re-
sale exemption contained in article 20.04(0).43 The taxpayer then argued
that its subsequent leases or sales of these containers, filled with gas, quali-
fied for exemption under article 20.04(E)(3)(a)(iii), which specifically deals
with returnable and non-returnable containers.44 Although the court ac-
knowledged that the taxpayer's purchase of the returnable cylinders meets
the literal requirements of a "sale of resale, leasing or renting," the court
determined that the legislature intended article 20.04(E)(3)(a)(iii) to require
payment of tax on receipts from the sale of returnable containers to those
who fill such containers and sell the contents together with the container. 45
The court noted that if the taxpayer purchased a non-returnable container,
filled it with gas, and sold it to a consumer, the taxpayer would not pay a tax
on his purchase of the container, but the consumer would pay sales tax on
35. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,699 (1984).
36. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
38. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,699 (1984).
39. Id.
40. Id. The comptroller reached the same conclusion in Decision 14,170. See Tex. Comp-
troller's Administrative Decision No. 14,170 (1984); see also Collins, Taxation, 1985 Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J. 545, 547 (discussing Decision 14,170).
41. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,699 (1984).
42. East Texas Oxygen Co. v. State, 681 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
43. TEX. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(0) (Vernon 1969) (now codified as TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.302 (Vernon Supp. 1986)). Section 151.302 provides an exemption for taxa-
ble items sold for resale. Id.
44. TEx. TAX-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(E)(3)(a)(iii) (Vernon 1969) (now codified as TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 151.322 (Vernon 1982)). Section 151.322(a)(3) provides an exemption for
a returnable container sold with its contents or resold for refilling. Id.
45. 681 S.W.2d at 744-45; see TEX. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(E)(3)(a)(iii) (Vernon
1969) (now codified as TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.322 (Vernon 1982).
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the container as part of his purchase. 46  In that event the sale for resale
exemption specifically applies. 47 If the container is returnable, however, or
if its sale to the consumer is exempt, the person purchasing the container
and selling the container filled with its contents would pay tax on his
purchase of the container, and the consumer of the contents would not pay
tax on the value of the container.48 The court concluded that this interpreta-
tion of the statute is required in order to effectuate the provisions of article
20.04(E)(3), which exempts sales of empty, non-returnable containers to one
who sells goods in the containers. 49
In two cases decided during the Survey period, the comptroller reiterated
his position that a financial institution may not claim the occasional sale
exemption granted by section 151.304(b)(1) of the Tax Code for property it
reposses.50 In Decision 15,97451 the comptroller held that the sale of an
airplane repossessed by a bank could not qualify as an occasional sale be-
cause financial institutions are considered to be engaged in the business of
seeling such taxable items at retail.52 The bank then argued that the airplane
constituted the entire operating assets of the former owner, and section
151.304(b)(2) of the Tax Code 53 exempts a sale of the entire operating assets
of a business. The comptroller noted that this exemption refers to the person
making the sale, not to the financial institution that has repossessed the
goods in question.5 4 Whether the comptroller would have reached the same
conclusion if the bank had operated a business prior to sale of the airplane
and the airplane constituted the entire operating assets of that business is not
clear.5 5 In Decision 15,79556 the comptroller again ruled that sales of prop-
erty acquired by financial institutions from defaulting debtors constitute
sales in the regular course of its business.5 7 Since the financial institution in
this case had made sales of at least two other items within the preceding
twelve months, the comptroller treated the bank as a retailer not entitled to
the occasional sale exemption under section 151.304(b)(1). 58
In Decision 16,19259 the comptroller required strict proof of a taxpayer's




50. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (occasional sales ex-
empt if not in ordinary course of business).
51. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 15,974 (1984).
52. Id.; see Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,338 (1982) (financial insti-
tution's sales of property received from defaulting debtors constitute sales in the ordinary
course of business).
53. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
54. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 15,974 (1984).
55. In Rule 3.316(d), the Comptroller has set forth the requirements for qualifying as a
separate business. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.316(d), [1 TEX.] ST. TAX
REP. (CCH) 66-165, at 7320 (Jan. 31, 1978).
56. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 15,795 (1984).
57. Id.
58. Id.; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1986). Section 151.304
of the Tax Code defines occasional sale to mean one or two retail sales of taxable items in a 12-
month period by a person not habitually in the business of selling such items. Id.
59. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 16,192 (1984).
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entitlement to the sale for resale exemption. 60 In this case the taxpayer
made a number of sales for which it did not collect sales tax. As proof that
the sales were exempt, the taxpayer merely provided an exemption number
for its purchasers. The comptroller ruled that sales must be documented by
exemption certificates. 61 The comptroller recently amended rules 3.282(0(1)
and (3)62 to specify the proof required for the resale exemption. The rule
now provides that, for transactions after October 2, 1984, resale and exemp-
tion certificates constitute the only acceptable proof that the taxpayer
purchased a taxable item for resale or qualifies for exemption. 63
C Procedure
In Bullock v. Mel Powers Investment Builder64 the Austin court of appeals
ruled that the district court did not acquire jurisdiction over a sales tax re-
fund claim because the taxpayer failed to file suit within thirty days after the
denial of his motion for rehearing of the comptroller's administrative deci-
sion on his claim. 65 The court noted that the statute allows a taxpayer to
bring suit against the comptroller provided that he meets the requirements
contained in article 1.11(A). 66 In this case the taxpayer did not file suit
within thirty days after denial of its motion for rehearing, as specifically re-
quired by article 1.1 l(A)(6).6 7 The court ruled that the thirty-day limitation
is clearly jurisdictional, and the comptroller was thus entitled to summary
judgment. 68 The court noted that the legislature drafted the refund statute
with the intent that a taxpayer should proceed through administrative chan-
nels prior to filing suit in district court.69
In Decision 15,55070 the comptroller ruled that no statute requires Texas
to await the conclusion of another state's audit prior to assessing and collect-
ing the Texas sales and use tax.7 ' In this case the taxpayer argued that
Louisiana auditors had not yet determined its liability for Louisiana sales
taxes; therefore, it could not calculate its proper credit against Texas taxes.
The comptroller noted that, after payment of Texas taxes, the taxpayer
could seek a credit for the Louisiana taxes paid.72
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.282(0(1), (3), [1 TEX.] ST. TAX. REP.
(CCH) T 66-005, at 7238 (Aug. 5, 1985).
63. Id.
64. 682 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
65. Id. at 403. Article 1.1 1(A) required three actions prior to filing suit in district court:
(1) the filing of a tax refund claim; (2) the overruling of the motion for rehearing; and (3) the
actual payment of any additional tax. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.11(A) (Vernon Supp.
1982) (now codified as TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.151-.154 (Vernon 1982)).
66. 682 S.W.2d at 402.
67. TEX. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 1.1 1(A)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (now codified as TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 112.151(c) (Vernon 1982)).
68. 682 S.W.2d at 403.
69. Id.





D. Miscellaneous Comptroller Decisions
The comptroller rendered four additional decisions during the Survey pe-
riod that merit discussion. In Decision 15,62873 the comptroller distin-
guished between separately stated transportation charges, which are exempt
from sales tax, and other handling costs associated with filling mail-orders
that are subject to the tax. 74 Under section 151.007(c)(7) of the Tax Code 75
charges for transportation of tangible personal property after a sale are not
included in the calculation of the sales price subject to sales and use tax if the
taxpayer separately identifies these charges. 76 The taxpayer in this case in-
cluded direct transportation charges with other handling charges and as-
serted that all of these charges should be included in costs associated with
transportation. The comptroller rejected the taxpayer's contention. 7 7
In Decision 16,06178 the comptroller determined that the taxpayer was
not the original producer of certain farm products, and thus section
151.316(9) of the Tax Code79 did not entitle him to an exemption for ma-
chinery and equipment the original producer used exclusively in the process-
ing and packing or marketing of agricultural products. 80 Although the
taxpayer owned the machinery and the chickens that laid the eggs that were
processed and marketed, the taxpayer previously contracted with farmers to
raise and care for the chickens on a day-to-day basis. The farmers also bore
a risk of loss because the owner gave no assurance that they would receive
adequate compensation for their effort. As a result, under the comptroller's
test set forth in Decision 11,120,81 the taxpayer failed to qualify as the origi-
nal producer, 82
The comptroller liberally interpreted useful life in determining that cer-
tain equipment used in a manufacturing process qualified for the exemption
under section 151.318(f) of the Tax Code83 in Decision 15,688.84 The comp-
troller ruled that equipment that had an expected useful life in excess of six
73. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 15,628 (1985).
74. Id.
75. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.007(c)(7) (Vernon 1982).
76. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 15,628 (1985). Subsequent to the
time the charges were made by the taxpayer in this case, the comptroller promulgated a new
rule that requires charges for transportation to be stated separately from sales price. The rule
also provides that transportation or delivery must take place after the completion of the sale.
Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.303(d)(1), [I TEX.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 66-
107, at 7311-13 (Dec. 24, 1984).
77. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 15,628 (1985).
78. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 16,061 (1984).
79. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.316(9) (Vernon 1982).
80. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 16,061 (1984).
81. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 11,120 (1981). The comptroller
stated two requirements that must be met for a person to qualify as the original producer:
1) the person must exercise operational control over the product; and 2) the person must bear
the risk of loss of the product. Id.
82. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 16,061 (1984).
83. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(f) (Vernon Supp. 1986). The section provides that
useful life of six months or less means that property will be completely consumed or without
value within six months.
84. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 15,688 (1984).
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months at the time of purchase could qualify for exemption if its actual use-
ful life to the taxpayer was less than six months because of service life or
obsolesence.8 5 In this case the taxpayer determined that utilization of a fur-
nace to produce particular items necessary in its manufacturing process was
uneconomical; therefore, the taxpayer ceased using the furnace. Although
the taxpayer had operated the furnace over a ten-month period, the control-
ler ruled that the furnace qualified for the six-month exemption because the
furnace remained idle for all but forty two days of the time the taxpayer
possessed it.86 The comptroller amended rule 3.300(a)(13) to incorporate
this position.8 7
In Decision 15,80988 the comptroller ruled that radio and radar equip-
ment installed on a tugboat became a component part of the vessel.8 9 Sec-
tion 151.329(4)(B) of the Tax Code exempts sales of component parts from
sales tax.90 The tax division asserted that the equipment leased by the tax-
payer did not permanently attach to the vessel because the lease required the
taxpayer to remove and return the equipment to the lessor at the end of the
lease term. The comptroller ruled, however, that the correct inquiry was
whether the property became a component part and not whether it became a
fixture. 9' Since the property was essential to the operation of the vessel and
became a constituent part of the vessel, the taxpayer qualified for the
exemption. 92
E. 1985 Tax Legislation
The Texas legislature completely restructured the taxation of telecommu-
nication services effective October 1, 1985. Telecommunications services are
now taxable services under section 151.0101 of the Tax Code,93 and tele-
graph companies are no longer subject to the gross receipts tax.94 Certain
telephone company services, however, remain subject to the gross receipts
tax.95 Section 151.323 exempts from the sales and use tax interstate long-
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.300(a)(13), [1 TEX.] ST. TAX REP.
(CCH) 66-092, at 7306 (Dec. 3, 1984). The rule currently excludes storage, standby, and
repair time from the computation of useful life. Id.
88. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 15,809 (1984).
89. Id.
90. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.329(4)(B) (Vernon 1982).
91. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 15,809 (1984). Under Rule
3.297(b)(2), the comptroller requires that a component part actually be attached to and be-
come a part of the vessel. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.297(b)(2), [1 TEX.] ST.
TAX REP. (CCH) 66-077, at 7299 (Mar. 24, 1978).
92. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 15,809 (1984).
93. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0101(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1986). Section 151.0101 de-
fines telecommunication services to mean the "electronic or electrical transmission, convey-
ance, routing, or reception of sounds, signals, data, or information" using virtually any method
(including long distance telephone service), but excluding the "storage of data or information
for subsequent retrieval or the processing, or reception and processing, of data or information
intended to change its form or content." Id.
94. Id. §§ 182.001-.004.
95. Id. § 182.061.
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distance telecommunications services, commercial radio or television broad-
casts (other than cable television service), and certain telephone service. 96 In
addition the legislature amended the definitions of seller and retailer in sec-
tion 151.008(b) by adding a new subparagraph (4) to include a hotel, motel,
or owner or lessor of an office or a residential building or development that
contracts and pays for telecommunication services for resale to a guest or
tenant. 97 Further, under section 151.025(c) a seller of telecommunications
services must distinguish on its invoices charges for taxable telecommunica-
tion services from charges for non-taxable items.98
Telecommunications services are exempt from local sales and use taxes,
MTA taxes, and regional transit taxes.99 A city or authority may, however,
begin to tax these services on or after October 1, 1987, by repealing the ex-
emption by a majority vote of the city's governing body or the authority's
board.'°° For purposes of local sales taxes, telecommunications services oc-
cur at the location of the machinery from which the transmission originates
unless such location is not determinable.10 1
The legislature repealed section 151.507(b) of the Tax Code to remove a
conflict with subchapter D of chapter 111 of the Tax Code. 10 2 Subchapter D
establishes a four-year limitation period for all state taxes, which runs from
the date the tax becomes due and payable.10 3 The legislature also repealed
section 151.513104 and replaced it with section 111.0081,105 which covers all
state taxes, not just sales and use taxes. Section 111.0081 provides that tax
assessments are due and payable ten days after they become final. 10 6 The
statute also provides for a ten percent penalty on delinquent payments. 0 7 In
the event of a re-determination hearing, the amount becomes due and paya-
ble twenty days after the decision becomes final.'
0 8
96. Id. § 151.323. The business of telephone companies currently subject to the gross
receipts tax under § 182.061 of the Tax Code includes basic local exchange telephone service
or telephone service paid for by the insertion of coins in a coin operated telephone. Id.
§ 182.061.
97. Id. § 151.008.
98. Id. § 151.025(c).
99. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1066c, § 4B(a) (local sales and use taxes);
1118x, § 11B(B)(b-1)(1) (MTA taxes); 111 8 y, § 16(f)(I-A)(A) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) (re-
gional transportation authority taxes).
100. Id. arts. 1066c, § 4B(b), ll18x, § llB(B)(b-1)(2), 1118y, § 16(f)(1-A)(B) (Vernon
Pam. Supp. 1986).
101. Id. arts. 1066c, § 6(B)(0, I I18x, § (b-l)(7), 1118y, § 16(f)(1)(2)(G).
102. Limited Sales, Exise, and Use Tax Act, ch. 24, § 1, 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws, Local &
Spec. 72, 89, repealed by Act of Jan. 8, 1985, ch. 37, § 4, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 127, 128
(Vernon).
103. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.201 (Vernon 1982). Sales tax becomes due and payable
on the 20th day of the month following the calendar month or quarter with respect to which
the tax is payable. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 111.204 (Vernon 1982), 151.401 (Vernon
Supp. 1986).
104. Limited Sales, Exise, and Use Tax Act, ch. 24, § 1, 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws, Local &
Spec. 72, 91 (repealed 1985).






The legislature repealed the exemption from use tax for tangible personal
property purchased outside Texas and brought into the state for use as a
licensed and certified carrier of persons or property. 10 9 Amendments to sec-
tion 151.307 specify the documentation required to claim a sales tax exemp-
tion for property exported outside the United States. 110 In addition, the
same requirements for documentation exist under a new section 151.330(g)
to obtain an exemption for tangible personal property shipped to a point
outside Texas. I "'
Finally, the legislature amended section 6(B)(2) of article 1066(c) of Texas
Civil Statutes." 12 The amended statute defines taxable use of tangible per-
sonal property purchased under a resale certificate for purposes of local sales
and use taxes.' 13 Property is taxable if used in a manner that would subject
it to the limited sales, excise, and use tax under section 151.154 the Tax
Code. 114 Previously, the statute did not define taxable use.
F Sales Tax Procedure Changes
During the Survey period the comptroller adopted a number of amended
rules. Rule 3.344 now lists detailed examples of taxable and non-taxable
telecommunication services and provides guidance for application of local
sales and use tax on telecommunication services. "15 In accordance with the
amendment of section 151.307 of the Tax Code, 1 6 the comptroller adopted
rule 3.323 to specify the information and forms required for the export
exemption.117
The comptroller amended rule 3.298 to include physical fitness centers as
places offering amusement services subject to sales tax, and to exclude
cruises that last over 24 hours and extend beyond Texas territorial limits.118
The rule was also amended to provide specifically that no tax will be due
upon the purchase of an admission to an amusement, entertainment, or rec-
109. Limited Sales, Exise, and Use Tax Act, ch. 24, § 1, 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws Local &
Spec. 72, 81 (repealed 1985).
110. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.307(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986). The legislature provided
that the following are proof of a right to the exemption: 1) a bill of lading; 2) United States
customs broker documentation; or 3) import documents. Id.
111. Id. § 151.330(g).
112. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1066c, § 6(B)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.344, [1 TEX.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH)
66-285, at 7390 (Dec. 30, 1985). Taxable services include enhanced services, auxiliary serv-
ices, intrastate long distance services, paging and mobile service, intrastate telegraph services,
taxable services received at a pay telephone if service is not provided by a telephone company,
sale or lease of telecommunication equipment, and installation of telecommunication services.
Id. Nontaxable services include interstate long distance services, basic local service, commer-
cial radio and television broadcasts, telecommunications services purchased for resale, inter-
state telegraph services, and separately stated installation charges. Id.
116. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.307(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
117. See Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.323, [1 TEX.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH)
66-195, at 7348 (Aug. 26, 1985).
118. See Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.298, [1 TEX.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH)
66-082, at 7299 (July 8, 1985).
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reational activity if purchased under a written prescription of a licensed
practioner.11 9 Further, sales of amusement services by non-profit organiza-
tions are subject to sales tax if the party providing the service is a profit-
making organization. 120 In addition, if two or more organizations provide
the amusement service and one provider is a non-profit organization, the
service is exempt only if the exempt organization incurs a risk of substantial
loss.121
The comptroller amended rule 3.292 to revise the definition of lump sum
contract. 122 In order to be treated as a separated contract under which serv-
ices rendered in repair or remodeling of tangible personal property are ex-
empt from sales tax, rule 3.292 requires the issuance of invoices that
separately set forth consumable supplies and equipment used in performing
the repair contract. 2 3 Previously, the taxpayer could exclude those items
without providing separate invoices. The comptroller increased from $500
to $1000 the maximum sales and use tax for filing on an annual, rather than
a monthly or quarterly, basis. 124
Finally, the comptroller revised rule 3.302(g) to narrow the trade-in exclu-
sion used in calculating sales tax base.' 25 Previously, the taxpayer could
exclude any trade-in of tangible personal property from his sales tax base.
The amended rule provides that the taxpayer may exclude a trade-in only if
it is of the same type property customarily sold in the taxpayer's regular
course of business.126
II. PROPERTY TAX
A. Application of Tax
In Oake v. Collin County127 the Texas Supreme Court held that a taxing
authority must prove its authority to collect taxes by showing that property
it seeks to assess has a taxable situs within the limits of its boundaries. 28
The Dallas court of appeals had ruled that Collin County could rely upon
two presumptions in its favor-that a taxing authority does not assess any
land located outside its boundaries and that an assessment is properly
made.' 2 9 The court of appeals concluded that the taxpayer failed to rebut
119. Id. at 7305.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 7304. The rule defines substantial risk of loss to mean that direct expenses
incurred by the exempt organization are equal to or greater than ten percent of the gross
receipts of the event. Id.
122. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.292, [1 TEX.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH)
66-052, at 7264 (Sept. 4, 1985).
123. Id.
124. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.335, [1 TEX.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH)
66-247, at 7371 (Mar. 13, 1985).
125. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.302(g), [1 TEX.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH)
66-102, at 7310 (Sept. 16, 1985).
126. Id.
127. 692 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1985).
128. Id. at 455.
129. Plano Indep. School Dist. v. Oake, 682 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 692 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1985). The court of appeals cited Crocker v.
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these presumptions because he had not established that his property did not
lie within the boundaries of Collin County. 130 The Texas Supreme Court
held that section 21.01 of Tax Code, 13' which grants the taxing unit author-
ity to tax real property located in the unit on January 1, requires Collin
County to prove that all land it sought to tax was situated within its geo-
graphical boundaries. 132 The court acknowledged that the taxpayer had re-
butted the presumption that Collin County's assessment was proper when
the taxpayer proved that the county could not locate its own boundary.1
33
In Lampson v. City of Beaumont 134 the Beaumont court of appeals inter-
preted the Texas Tax Increment Financing Act of 1981.135 Section 2(8) of
the Act provides that tax increment base means the total appraised value of
all taxable real property in a reinvestment zone for the year in which the
zone was designated.136 Section 3(a) of the Act further provides that an
incorporated city or town must adopt an ordinance in order to designate an
area as a reinvestment zone.137 Lampson argued that section 2(8) of the Act
requires that the year designated in the ordinance for the zone to begin must
be the year of appraisal for property within the district. In this case the zone
was designated to begin on January 1, 1983. The appellate court, however,
agreed with the City of Beaumont that the legislature clearly intended the
appraisal of the property to occur in the year the City adopts the ordinance,
which in this case would be 1982.138 The court noted that the statute re-
quires that the adoption of the ordinance designating the reinvestment zone
occur in a year prior to the year in which the zone takes effect. 139 Lampson
raised this issue because the taxing entities were given insufficient time and
notice of the designation of the reinvestment zone to properly plan for tax
revenues in 1983. In 1983 the legislature made a number of amendments to
the Act requiring a city to give notices, presentations, and financial informa-




In Plainview Independent School District v. Edmonson Wheat Growers,
Santo Consol. Indep. School Dist., 116 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1938, writ
dism'd), and held that, without evidence to the contrary, the court presumes that the taxing
authority correctly assessed the tax. See also Nolan v. San Antonio Ranch Co., 81 Tex. 315,
317, 16 S.W. 1064, 1065 (1891) (burden of proving error of assessment on taxpayer).
130. 682 S.W.2d at 303.
131. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.01 (Vernon 1982).
132. 692 S.W.2d at 455.
133. Id.
134. 687 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
135. Id. at 790; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1066e (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
136. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1066e, § 2(8) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
137. Id. § 3(a).
138. 687 S.W.2d at 790.
139. Id. The statute mandates that the zone take effect on January 1 of the year following
the adoption of the ordinance. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1066e, § 4(g)(3) (Vernon
Pam. Supp. 1986).
140. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1066e, § 4(a-e) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
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Inc. 141 the Amarillo court of appeals held that grain delivered by producer-
members to a cooperative marketing association did not lose its status as
farm products in the hands of the producer and therefore remained exempt
from taxation under section 11.16 of the Tax Code.1 42 In this case one of a
farmer's options upon delivery of grain to an elevator owned by the associa-
tion was to receive an advance based upon the current market price less
anticipated selling expenses. The taxing authorities argued that the delivery
of grain under this option constituted a sale to the Association, and the grain
no longer remained in the hands of the producer-member. The taxing au-
thorities cited a 1923 Texas Supreme Court case 143 that held that a market-
ing agreement between a cotton producer and a cotton growers association
amounted to a contract for sale and not an agency contract. 144 The court of
appeals ruled, however, that in Texas Certified Cottonseed Breeders' Ass'n v.
Aldridge145 the Texas Supreme Court had reversed its position and held that
the delivery of the commodities to the association to enable it to effectuate its
purposes did not result in a contract of sale, but rather an agency agree-
ment. 146 The court also noted that the Texas attorney general has on nu-
merous occasions followed this rationale in holding that farm products
delivered to a cooperative association pursuant to a contract for sale and
delivery remained farm products in the hands of the producer and as such
were non-taxable.1 47
In Military Highway Water Supply Corp. v. Boone' 48 the Corpus Christi
court of appeals strictly construed the exemption for charitable organiza-
tions granted by section 11.18(c)(1) of the Tax Code. 149 This section re-
quires that an organization be "organized exclusively to perform religious,
charitable, scientific,.. . purposes and, .. . engage exclusively in performing
one or more of the following charitable functions: .... ,,150 In 1982 Military
Highway Water Supply Corp. amended its articles of incorporation to per-
mit the corporation to provide community services beneficial to the corpora-
tion's general members. The appellate court agreed with the chief appraiser
of Hidalgo County that this amendment precluded exemption of the corpo-
ration because its charter no longer provided that the corporation was or-
141. 681 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
142. Id. at 302. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.16(b) (Vernon 1982) (farm products in
hands of producer exempt),
143. Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n v. Stovall, 113 Tex. 273, 253 S.W. 1101, 1107
(1923).
144. Id. at 288-89.
145. 122 Tex. 464, 61 S.W.2d 79 (1933).
146. 681 S.W.2d at 301-02.
147. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. Nos. M-632 (1970), V-511 (1948), 0-5484 (1943), 0-5091
(1943). In Opinion No. 0-5484, the attorney general stated that the purpose of article 8, § 19,
of the Texas Constitution was to prevent imposition of a tax on farm products when the tax
would bear directly upon the producer, and that this purpose would be defeated if taxes were
levied on the goods held by the association because the producers would ultimately bear the
burden of taxation. Id.
148. 688 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
149. Id. at 651; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § l1.18(c)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
150. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § l1.18(c)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1986). The Tax Code lists thir-
teen charitable functions. Id. § 11.18(c)(1)(A)-(M).
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ganized exclusively to perform permitted purposes.151
The Amarillo court of appeals upheld the exemption of a non-profit hospi-
tal corporation organized exclusively to provide medical care without regard
to the beneficiaries' ability to pay. 152 The appraisal district denied the hospi-
tal's exemption on the grounds that the non-charitable functions performed
by the hospital were not merely incidental to its charitable functions. The
court held that the hospital satisfied the three elements required for a public
charity set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in the City of Houston v. Scot-
tish Rite Benevolent Association:153 (1) the organization does not make a
profit; (2) it accomplishes entirely benevolent ends; and (3) it benefits per-
sons, indefinite in numbers and personalities, by preventing them, through
absolute gratuity, from burdening society and the state. 154 The court then
noted that property may be used by non-charitable individuals or entities if
such use is incidental to the qualified charitable organization's purpose, and
the use is limited to activities that benefit the beneficiaries of the organiza-
tion.155 The court also noted that the Texas Supreme Court has ruled that
receipt of income by a charitable hospital from paying patients does not de-
stroy the hospital's charity status. 156 Although charity patients constituted
only eight in fifteen percent of the total number of patients treated at the
hospital, the court upheld the district court's finding that the organization
had assumed, to a material extent, a task that otherwise might become the
obligation of the community or state. 157 The court considered it important
that the hospital had never denied a patient medical or hospital services be-
cause of inability to pay. 1 58
In Dallas Symphony Association, Inc. v. Dallas County Appraisal Dis-
trict1 59 the Dallas court of appeals held that section 11.18(c)(1)(E) of the
Tax Code 160 entitled the Association to an exemption from property tax as a
purely public charity. 16 1 The purpose clause of the Association's charter
stated that it was organized and operated "for charitable or educational pur-
poses as defined in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ... and
the corporation shall have as its primary purpose the promotion of musical
and educational activities through the organization, management, mainte-
nance, operation, and control of a symphony orchestra and of allied and
151. 688 S.W.2d at 651.
152. Lamb County Appraisal Dist. v. South Plains Hospital-Clinic, Inc., 688 S.W.2d 896,
908 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18(d) (Vernon
1982) provides that a charitable organization will not lose its exemption by performing non-
charitable functions if those functions are incidental to the charitable functions of the organi-
zation. Id,
153. 111 Tex. 191, 198-99, 230 S.W. 978, 981 (1921).
154. 688 S.W.2d 896, 904-06 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
155. Id. at 905.
156. Id.; see City of McAllen v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 530 S.W.2d
806, 810 (Tex. 1975).
157. 688 S.W.2d at 906.
158. Id. at 904.
159. 695 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
160. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § l1.18(c)(l)(E) (Vernon Supp. 1986). This section provides
that a symphony orchestra qualifies as a charitable function.
161. 695 S.W.2d at 601.
[Vol. 40
TAXATION
kindred activities.' 62 The court held that reference to section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code did not so broaden the purposes of the Associa-
tion as to invalidate its exemption. 163 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code 164 provides for a number of different types of charitable activities,
stated in the alternative, and the statute does not require an organization to
perform all of the listed activities to qualify for Federal income tax exemp-
tion.' 65 The appraisal district also asserted that the Association did not
meet the requirements of a purely public charity set forth in City of Houston
v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Association.166 Classification as a purely public
charity requires that the organization assume, to a material extent, services
that otherwise might become an obligation or duty of the community or the
state. 167 Based upon a number of affidavits supporting the Association's mo-
tion for summary judgment, the court concluded that the Association quali-
fied as a purely public charity as a matter of law. 168 The court noted that
the appraisal district and the appraisal review board had not supported their
assertion that if the Association ceased conducting its operations it would
not become an obligation of the city or the state. 169 The affidavits support-
ing the Association's summary judgment motion asserted that the needs of
citizens include not only basic essentials services such as streets, police, and
fire protection, but also include libraries, art museums, and other cultural
activities. In addition the evidence showed that the city, state, and federal
governments publicly supported the Association in recognition of its benefits
to the community.
Finally, the second argument of the appraisal district contended that,
under Military Highway Water Supply Corp. v. Boone, 170 the inclusion of the
language "and of all allied and kindred activities" made the purpose clause
overly broad. 17 " The court distinguished Military Highway, however, be-
cause the language in this case merely refers to activities carried on for the
specific purpose of promoting and operating a symphony orchestra, and it
does not add any additional, non-exempt, activities. 172 Although the court
noted that constitutionality of the statute under Article VIII, Section 2 of
the Texas Constitution was not properly before the Court, the finding that
the Association constituted a purely public charity specifically addressed the
issue of whether the property tax code was being applied constitutionally to
the exemption of the Association. 173
162. Id. at 596.
163. 695 S.W.2d at 597-98.
164. I.R.C. § 561(c)(3) provides that corporations organized solely for charitable purposes
qualify for federal tax exemption. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
165. 695 S.W.2d at 597-98.
166. 111 Tex. 191, 230 S.W. 978 (1921).
167. Id. at 199, 230 S.W. at 981.
168. 695 S.W.2d at 599.
169. Id.
170. 688 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
171. 695 S.W.2d at 600.
172. Id. at 601.




Three courts addressed the exemption granted to certain taxing authori-
ties from assessment of court costs. In Aldine Independent School District v.
Moore174 a Houston court of appeals ruled that section 33.49 of the Tax
Code 175 prohibits a trial court from ordering a school district to deposit se-
curity for payment of attorney ad litem fees. 176 Section 33.49(a) provides
that a taxing unit may not be assessed for court costs in a suit to collect taxes
and may not require the taxing unit to post security for the costs. 177
In Arnold v. Crockett Independent School District178 the Tyler court of
appeals reconciled the apparent conflict between the exemption granted to
taxing units under section 33.49179 for lawsuits to collect taxes and the au-
thority granted to the reviewing court under section 42.0718 to allocate ap-
peal costs to any or all of the parties. 181 The court held that section 33.49(a)
exempts a school district, in a suit to collect taxes, from court costs incurred
both at the trial court and the appellate level. 182 The court then held that
chapter 42 of the Tax Code' 8 3 only applies to appeals from determinations
made by the appraisal review board.184 The court reasoned that permitting
the application of chapter 42 to delinquent tax suits would allow the court to
assess court costs against taxing units. 185 Section 33.49 specifically prohibits
such a result.186
In Plano Independent School District v. Oake187 the Dallas court of ap-
peals, in dictum, also held that a school district could not be required to file
an appeal bond in a delinquent tax suit. 188 The court noted that the Austin
court of appeals reached the same conclusion in Brady Independent School
174. 694 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).,
175. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.49 (Vernon 1982).
176. 694 S.W.2d at 455.
177. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.49(a) (Vernon 1982). Section 33.49(a) specifically prohib-
its a court from requiring a taxing unit to post security for costs. Section 33.49(b), however,
permits assessment of publication and notice costs against taxing units. Id. § 33.49(b).
178. 688 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no writ).
179. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.49 (Vernon 1982).
180. Id. § 42.07. This provision authorizes the reviewing court to charge all or any part of
the costs of an appeal under chapter 42 against any of the parties. Id.
181. 688 S.W.2d at 885-86.
182. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 42.01-.43 (Vernon 1982).
183. 688 S.W.2d at 885.
184. 688 S.W.2d at 885-86.
185. Id. Section 42.28 prohibits a court from requiring an appeal bond of certain parties:
"[a] party may appeal the final judgment of the district court as provided by law for appeal of
civil suits generally, except that an appeal bond is not required of the chief appraiser, the
county, the State Property Tax Board, or the commissioners court." TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 42.28 (Vernon 1982).
186. See id. § 33.49 (Vernon 1982); see supra note 177.
The court stated that it disagreed with the Austin court of appeals' reasoning in Brady
Indep. School Dist. v. Davenport, 663 S.W.2d 637, 638-39 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
The court in Brady implied that sections 42.07 and 42.28 would apply to a suit by a school
district or other taxing unit to collect delinquent taxes, and would permit the court to require
an appeal bond in such suits.
187. 682 S.W.2d 359, rev'd on other grounds, 692 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1985).
188. Id. at 361.
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District v. Davenport.'89 The Arnold court, however, interpreted Brady to
have reached the opposite result. 190
In Rockdale Independent School District v. Thorndale Independent School
District'91 the Austin court of appeals ruled that a party must pursue its
administrative remedies under chapters 41 and 42 of the Tax Code, 192 in
strict .compliance with the procedures of those chapters, to be entitled to
judicial review. 93 In Rockdale two taxing districts had disputed the loca-
tion of certain taxable property. The Milam County Appraisal Review
Board determined that the situs of the property was within Rockdale's limits
for 1982 and 1983. The Thorndale Independent School District received
notice of the Board's decision and filed its notice of appeal more than fifteen
days after the receipt of the notice of determination from the appraisal re-
view board. Section 42.06 of the Tax Code requires that notice of appeal
must be filed with the body issuing the order within fifteen days after receipt
of the notice of the final order. 94 Thorndale argued that it had sent a notice
of appeal within the required time limit, but the appraisal review board
never received the initial notice. The Austin court of appeals ruled that the
requirements of section 42.06 must be "strictly adhered to and failure to do
so results in the non-complying party's losing the right to challenge the deci-
sion."' 195 The court also held that Thorndale could not rely on section 1.08
of the Tax Code, 196 which permits a property owner to furnish satisfactory
proof that a notice was deposited in the mail before the fifteen-day period
had ended, because Thorndale was not a property owner.' 97 Section 42.06
required Thorndale to prove actual delivery and receipt within the fifteen
day period. 198
In a similar case the Dallas court of appeals ruled that compliance with
the notice of appeal requirements of section 42.06 of the Tax Code is juris-
dictional and that section 42.06 prohibits an appeal from a final order of an
appraisal review board if such notice is not properly given. 199 In Corchine
Partnership v. Dallas County Appraisal District2°° the taxpayers served writ-
ten notice on the appraisal district within the fifteen-day period, but notice
was not properly served on the appraisal review board. The court noted that
the board and the district constitute separate entities and since the lawsuit
must be maintained against both the appraisal district and the review board,
notice of appeal must be served upon both.201
189. 663 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ). See supra note 186.
190. Arnold, 688 S.W.2d at 885.
191. 681 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
192. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.01-.69, §§ 42.01-.43 (Vernon 1982).
193. 681 S.W.2d at 227.
194. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.06 (Vernon 1982).
195. 681 S.W.2d at 227.
196. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.08 (Vernon 1982).
197. 681 S.W.2d at 227.
198. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.06 (Vernon 1982).
199. Corchine Partnership v. Dallas County Appraisal Dist., 695 S.W.2d 734, 735-36 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
200. Id. at 734.
201. Id. at 735-36.
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In Texas Architectural Aggregate, Inc. v. Adams 20 2 the Austin court of
appeals held that the procedures of chapters 41 and 42 of the Tax Code 20 3
provide the exclusive procedures for adjudication of property tax controver-
sies. 20 4 The taxpayer had failed to provide the notice of appeal required by
section 42.06 of the Tax Code 20 5 within the fifteen-day time period. The
taxpayer also failed to file a lawsuit within forty-five days after receiving
notice of entry of the final order, as required by section 42.41. 2o6 The tax-
payer argued that the district court had jurisdiction to grant equitable relief
to the taxpayer on the grounds that the assessment was grossly excessive.
Prior to enactment of the Texas Property Tax Code, the courts recognized a
common-law cause of action to allow judicial review of an assessment made
in violation of the Texas Constitution.20 7
The court determined, however, that the enactment of section 42.09 abol-
ished the former common-law cause of action for equitable relief from as-
sessment of such taxes.20 8 The court ruled that the administrative review
process set forth in the property tax code provides the taxpayer with an
opportunity to challenge the assessment and the procedures set forth in the
property tax code for adjudication of the grounds of protest are exclusive. 20 9
In two other cases decided during the Survey period, courts strictly con-
strued the administrative procedures against taxing authorities. In Herndon
Marine Products, Inc. v. San Patricio County Appraisal Review Board210 the
Corpus Christi court of appeals ruled that the fifteen-day period for the tax-
payer to file his notice of appeal under section 42.06 of the Tax Code did not
begin to run until the appraisal review board had delivered to the property
owner and the chief appraiser a notice of the issuance of the order and a
copy of the order.211 The court ruled that the appraisal review board must
conclusively prove all essential elements of its claim to be entitled to sum-
mary judgment. 21 2 In this case the appraisal review board could not prove
that it had complied with section 41.47 by delivering a copy of the order.21 3
In Moody House, Inc. v. Galveston County2 14 a Houston court of appeals
held that the taxpayer need not take any action under the administrative
provisions of chapters 41 and 42 of the Tax Code until receiving specific
notice that the chief appraiser had denied its application for exemption as a
202. 690 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
203. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.45-.69; 42.01-.07, .09-20, .22-25 (Vernon 1982);
§§ 41.41-44; 42.08, .21, .26-.29 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
204. 690 S.W.2d at 643.
205. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.06 (Vernon 1982).
206. 690 S.W.2d at 643; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.41 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
207. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 20 provides that property will not be assessed for ad valorem
taxes at a value in excess of its fair market value.
208. 690 S.W.2d at 642.
209. Id. at 643.
210. 695 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
211. Id. at 32.
212. Id. at 33.
213. Id. at 33; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.47 (Vernon 1982) (requiring appraisal board
to deliver notice of issuance of order and copy of order to taxpayer and chief appraiser). Id.
214. 687 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ refld n.r.e.).
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charitable organization. 21 5 The chief appraiser had sent a letter to the tax-
payer stating that he was withholding approval or disapproval until the out-
come of a pending law suit. Section 11.45 of the Tax Code requires that the
chief appraiser either approve or disapprove an application, or modify the
exemption applied for. 2 16 The district court had agreed with the taxing au-
thorities that failure to take any of these specific actions violated section
11.45(c) and that failure to act was in effect, a denial of the exemption appli-
cation. The court of appeals disagreed, reasoning that the statute does not
preclude a chief appraiser from postponing his determination pending the
outcome of other proceedings. 21 7
D. 1985 Tax Legislation
During its 1985 regular session, the Texas Legislature made a number of
significant amendments to the property tax laws. The legislature amended
chapter 41, concerning property owner protests, by adding section 41.411.2 18
This section permits a property owner to protest the failure of the chief ap-
praiser or the appraisal review board to provide or deliver any notice to
which the property owner is entitled. 2 19 Revised section 41.44 changes the
deadline for a property owner to file a written protest with the appraisal
review board to obtain a hearing to the later of July 1 or the 30th day after
the date that notice of appraised value was given to the property owner.
2 20
The legislature also added section 41.12(b) to require the appraisal review
board to complete substantially all timely filed protests before approving the
appraisal records. 22 1 In addition, section 41.12(b) states that appraisal
records may not be approved if the total appraised values of all properties on
which the taxpayer files protests is more than 5% of the total appraised
value of all other taxable properties.222 Section 42.21 now lists the parties
who must be named in a petition for district court review of a property tax
determination brought under section 42.02.223 Section 42.21(c) specifies the
proper parties to be served in such an action. 224 Section 25.25 now provides
a procedure for securing a hearing before the appraisal review board for the
purpose of determining whether the appraiser has made a substantial error
215. Id. at 437.
216. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.45 (Vernon 1982).
217. 687 S.W.2d at 437.
218. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.411 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
219. Id. The property owner must comply with the payment provisions of § 42.08 of the
Tax Code to be entitled to a protest under this provision. Id. § 41.41 1(c).
220. Id. § 41.44.
221. Id. § 41.12(b).
222. Id. The legislature deleted the requirement in section 41.47(c) that the appraisal re-
view board resolve all protests before approving the records.
223. Id. § 42.21(b).
224. Id. § 42.21(c). If the chief appraiser files a petition, he must bring the action against
the appraisal review board and the property owner. Id. If the taxing unit files a petition, the
unit must bring the action against the appraisal district, the appraisal review board, and the
property owner. Id. Any other petitioners must bring the action against the appraisal district
and appraisal review board. Id. Personal service on the chief appraiser operates as service on
the appraisal district personal service on the chairman of the appraisal review board operates
as service on the appraisal review board. Id.
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in a property tax appraisal roll that requires correction. 225 Section 25.25(d)
requires that a motion be filed jointly by the chief appraiser and a property
owner. 226 Section 33.011 now permits the governing body of a taxing unit to
waive penalties and interest on a delinquent tax if an officer, employee, or
agent of the taxing unit caused the taxpayer to fail to pay the tax before it
became delinquent. 227 The legislature amended section 42.08 by adding sub-
section (c), which permits the district court to hold a hearing to determine
whether the property owner has substantially but not fully complied with
the section 42.08 requirement that the owner pay any tax due before it be-
comes delinquent to preserve his right to appeal. 228
The legislature has also tightened the deadlines for various actions re-
quired to prepare the appraisal rolls. Taxpayers must deliver rendition state-
ments before April 1 (formerly May 1) unless the taxpayer submits a written
application for extention to April 30.229 The legislature also amended the
dates for submission of the chief appraiser's certified estimate of appraised
value and submission of approved changes by the appraisal review. 2 30
Amended section 26.01(c) of the Tax Code provides that the appraisal dis-
trict's board of directors may not extend the deadline for certification of the
appraisal roll. 2 3 1
The legislature has substituted a new median appraisal method for the
prior weighted average method for comparing appraisals within an appraisal
district. 23 2 In addition, amendments to section 5.10(a) require an annual
study by the state property tax board to determine the degree of uniformity
of appraisals in each appraisal district. 233 Amended section 23.01 adds an
overriding valuation principle to the earlier general principles. 234 The stat-
ute provides that the appraisal of each property must be based on the indi-
vidual characteristics that affect its market value. 2 5 Revised section 22.03
no longer requires the chief appraiser to actually view oil and gas properties
reported to have decreased in value in order to verify the reported change. 236
The legislature also amended sections 26.04, 26.05, and 26.06 to modify the
225. Id. § 25.25(d), (e), (0.
226. Id. § 25.25(d).
227. Id. § 33.011.
228. Id. § 42.08. If the court determines that the property owner has substantially com-
plied with § 42.08, the court then allows the owner 30 days to comply fully before dismissing
the action. Id.
229. Id. § 22.23. Section 22.23(b) provides that the property owner may receive an addi-
tional extension to May 15 upon a showing of good cause. Id. § 22.23(b).
230. Id. §§ 25.20(a), 25.22(a). These amendments merely remove the language "or as soon
thereafter as practicable" from the statutes.
231. Id. § 26.01(c) (deadline may not be extended beyond July 25 of each year).
232. Id. § 1.12. Conforming changes have been made in §§ 41.41(2) (right of protest),
41.43 (protest of inequality of appraisal), and 42.26 (remedy for unequal appraisal). Id.
§§ 41.41(2), 41.43, 42.26.
233. Id. § 5.10(a). Previously, the statute required a biennial study.
234. Id. § 23.01(b).
235. Id. The other two market valuation principles include application of generally ac-
cepted appraisal techniques and use of the same or similar techniques in appraising the same or
similar kinds of property. Id.
236. Id. § 22.03(b), (d).
[Vol. 40
TAXATION
procedures that a taxing unit must follow in calculating a property tax rate,
adopting the rate, and increasing the rate.237 Further, taxpayers now have
the right to enjoin the adoption of a tax rate238 or collection of tax239 if the
taxing authority acted in bad faith in failing to follow the proper
procedure. 24 o
Under new section 6.032, taxing units participating in appraisal districts
may provide for staggered terms for the members of the board of direc-
tors.24 1 The option of staggered terms is not available if the method of ap-
pointing members to the board of directors permits cumulative voting.242
The legislature adopted a second section 6.032, which provides a procedure
for the recall of a director of an appraisal district. 243 Section 6.411 now
authorizes the board of directors of an appraisal district for a county of at
least 1,500,000 to add to the appraisal review board up to fifteen additional
members who may hear tax protests. 244 The statute mandates that the addi-
tional members be nonvoting.245 Amended section 6.06 specifies that an
appraisal district's fiscal year will be the calendar year unless a different fis-
cal year is adopted by the governing body of at least three-fourths of the
taxing units.246
The legislature amended section 31.04 to provide that the assessor will
determine each taxpayer's delinquency date by the mailing date of the bill.247
If a tax assessor mails the bill by January 10, the delinquency date will be
February 1.248 If the assessor mails the bill after January 10, however, the
delinquency date will be the first day of the next month.249 This postpone-
ment will allow the taxpayer at least 21 days after the mailing date to pay the
tax. Taxing units are no longer required to publish notice every five years
for delinquent taxpayers whose names and addresses cannot be deter-
mined. 2 50 Section 33.04 also relieves the taxing unit from providing annual
notice of delinquency to a taxpayer if the tax collector does not know and
cannot determine his name and address. 25'
The legislature added a new category of charitable organizations to sec-
tion 11.18. Revised section 11.18 authorizes an exemption from property
tax for organizations that raise funds for several organizations for general
charitable purposes and that are affiliated with state or national charities. 25 2
237. Id. §§ 26.04, .05, .06.
238. Id. § 26.04(h).
239. Id. § 26.05(d).
240. Id. §§ 26.04(h), 26.05(d).
241. Id. § 6.032(a).
242. Id.
243. Id. § 6.032.
244. Id. § 6.411.
245. Id. § 6.411(b).
246. Id. § 6.06(i).
247. Id. § 31.04.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. § 33.04.
251. Id.
252. Id. § 11.18(r). To qualify for the exemption a volunteer board of directors must gov-
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Amended section 11.13(n) provides that a residence homestead exemption
will be available to a taxpayer for the year in which the taxing unit adopts
the exemption provided that the governing body of the taxing unit adopts
the exemption before May 1.2 53
The legislature amended section 22.27(a) to permit disclosure of confiden-
tial information to the state property tax board. 254 In addition new subsec-
tion (d) to section 22.27 protects persons providing such confidential
information from liability to other persons. 255 Amendments to the Property
Redevelopment and Tax Abatement Act allow cities to designate property
outside their territorial jurisdictions as reinvestment zones256 and to desig-
nate unincorporated areas as reinvestment zones. 25 7
III. FRANCHISE TAXES
A. Calculation of Taxable Capital
In an unpublished opinion the Austin court of appeals held that the comp-
troller's rule making the computation of franchise tax dependent upon the
manner in which the taxpayer keeps its books violates the Texas Constitu-
tion's prohibition against unequal and nonuniform taxation.258 In Bullock v.
Samedan Oil Co. 259 the taxpayer stated that the Securities and Exchange
Commission required it to capitalize intangible drilling and development
costs on its books. This method of accounting resulted in a greater amount
of capital subject to franchise tax than a similar corporation would be re-
quired to report if not regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. 260  Rule 3.391(b)(1) requires that h taxpayer report and reflect the
corporation's financial condition as shown in its books and records of ac-
count. 26' The comptroller has indicated that a new rule 3.413 will be pro-
ern the organization. In addition, the organization must contribute to at least five other as-
sociations that qualify under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code; and such
associations must use the contributions for general charitable purposes. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(1982). The legislature adopted an additional amendment to section 11.18(c)(3) to carve out
an exception for organizations qualified under section 501(c)(12) of the Internal Revenue Code
concerning distribution of assets upon discontinuance of the organization. TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 11.18(c)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986). Section 501(c)(12) provides that a qualifying organi-
zation may distribute to members and each member must be required by membership agree-
ments to immediately transfer assets to the state or to a section 501(c)(3) charitable
organization. I.R.C. § 501(c)(12) (1982).
253. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.13(n) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
254. See id. § 22.27(a).
255. Id. § 22.27(d).
256. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1066f, § 3(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
257. Id. § 7A. Prior to designation by a county of a reinvestment zone, the commissioners
court must first hold a public hearing and find that the designation would benefit the property
included in the proposed zone, and that the anticipated development would contribute to the
economic development of the county. Id.
258. [2 TEX.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 400-125, at 22,093 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no




261. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.391(b)(1), [I TEX.] ST. TAX REP.
(CCH) 14-001, at 994 (Oct. 18, 1979).
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posed in the near future that will require all taxpayers to adopt certain
uniform accounting conventions for purposes of computing franchise taxes.
In Decision 13,365262 the comptroller ruled that a reserve established by a
corporation for an early retirement program should be treated as a debt,
reducing the corporation's taxable capital, rather than as a contingent liabil-
ity.263 The tax division noted that, under the terms of the plan, payments
would terminate if an employee later went to work for an unrelated corpora-
tion. The comptroller determined, however, that the obligations represented
a fixed liability, subject to a condition subsequent. 264 In Decision 12,055265
the comptroller reiterated his position that a parent corporation must report
the value of a subsidiary corporation at its net book value unless the tax-
payer can substantiate another basis for valuing the subsidiary. 266
B. Apportionment of Capital-Business in Texas
In Decisions 9787 and 12,316267 the comptroller ruled that goods sold by
a foreign corporation to a Texas purchaser were excludable from the calcula-
tion of the proceeds from business done in Texas because the goods were not
delivered in Texas.268 Since the goods were purchased for shipment to Japan
and the comptroller held that the purchaser did not take possession of, con-
trol over, or title to the goods in Texas, the proceeds were excluded under
section 171.103(1) of the Tax Code.2 69 The tax division argued that delivery
to a third party carrier leased by a Texas purchaser resulted in possession
and control over the goods by the purchaser in Texas. The comptroller
noted that the seller must transfer actual physical possession and control of
goods to the purchaser in Texas for inclusion of the proceeds under section
171. 103.27° In this case the purchaser did not exercise complete control over
the barges and railroad tank cars used to transport the goods. 271
The comptroller has proposed a revised rule 3.406 that would greatly ex-
pand the definition of doing business in Texas for purposes of applying the
franchise tax to foreign corporations. 272 Proposed rule 3.406 would signifi-
262. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,365 (1984).
263. Id.
264. Id.; cf Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,613 (1983) (holding an
employer's bonus program should be treated as a debt).
265. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,055 (1985).
266. Id. Rule 3.405(c)(4) requires the parent company to value a subsidiary using the cost
method of accounting. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.405(c)(4), [I TEX.] ST.
TAX REP. (CCH) 14-071, at 1039 (Dec. 13, 1977).
267. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision Nos. 9787 and 12,316 (1984).
268. Id.
269. Id.; see TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 171.103(1) (Vernon 1982).
270. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision Nos. 9787 and 12,316 (1984); see Bullock
v. Enserch Exploration, Inc., 614 S.W.2d 215, 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref d
n.r.e.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 946 (1982).
271. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision Nos. 9787 and 12,316 (1984). In this
decision the comptroller appears to take a more restrictive view of doing business than re-
quired under rule 3.403(e)(3). The rule provides that delivery in Texas to a vessel owned or
leased by the purchaser constitutes business in Texas. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts,
Rule 3.403(e)(3), [1 TEX.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 14-061, at 1023 (Feb. 4, 1985).
272. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 10 Tex. Reg. 3798 (1985).
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cantly reduce the number and type of contacts for application of the
franchise tax. Paragraph (b) provides that "[a] corporation is doing business
in Texas, for purposes of the Texas Tax Code, chapter 171, when it has a
constitutional nexus with Texas for the purpose of franchise taxation.
273
This would result in much broader application than the present rule, which
states that a corporation is doing business in Texas when it is "transacting
some part of its ordinary business in Texas." '274 Proposed rule 3.406(c) pro-
vides examples of specific activities that will constitute doing business in
Texas, including (1) maintaining any inventory in the state; (2) providing
any service in Texas; (3) soliciting through agents in Texas; (4) owning, ac-
quiring, leasing, or disposing of any real estate in Texas; (5) maintaining a
place of business or managing, directing or performing services for subsidiar-
ies in Texas, (6) having employees, independent contractors, agents, or other
representatives promoting sales in Texas, or (7) leasing tangible personal
property used in Texas. 275 Under the proposed rule, an out-of-state lender
holding a security interest in Texas real estate could become liable for
franchise taxes on acquisition of the property in a foreclosure.
C. 1985 Franchise Tax Legislation
Transportation companies became subject to the franchise tax on August
26, 1985.276 These companies were previously subject to the gross receipts
tax, which the attorney general declared unconstitutional in 1983.277
The legislature also made a number of changes in the reporting periods
and due dates for franchise taxes. The legislature amended section 171.202
to change the manner in which the minimum amount of franchise tax is
computed for corporations whose initial report is its last filed report.278
Amended section 171.362(e) precludes application of penalties on the total
amount actually paid by June 15 when a corporation obtains a filing exten-
273. Id. at 3799.
274. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.406(b), [1 TEX.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH)
14-076, at 1040 (Sept. 5, 1983).
275. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 10 Tex. Reg. 3798, 3799 (1985).
276. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171,052 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The legislature amended
§ 171.052 by deleting language that exempted from franchise tax "any transportation com-
pany; or sleeping, palace, car, and dining company" subject to the gross receipts tax on
utilities.
277. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-83 (1983). The legislature repealed subchapter C of
chapter 182 of the Tax Code, which formerly subjected transportation companies to the gross
receipts tax. Act of Jan. 8, 1985, ch. 31, § 3, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 96, 97 (Vernon).
278. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.202(d) (Vernon Supp. 1986). Previously, the statute
required a corporation to remit either 90% of the amount to be reported on its return filed by
June 15, or the amount resulting from multiplying the prior year's payment by the ratio of
twelve divided by the number of months covered by the initial return. Now, the corporation
must remit under the second alternative the amount resulting from multiplying the Texas
portion of taxable capital and surplus required to be shown on the initial report by the general
franchise tax rate in effect under section 171.002(a)(1). Id. § 171.002(a)(1). The legislature
also amended sections 171.201 (initial report), 171.202 (annual reports), and 171.152 (date on
which payment is due) to change the due dates for a corporation which is the survivor in a
merger. Id. §§ 171.152, .201, .202. Sections 171.153 (business on which the tax is based) and
171.1531 new section establishing a credit for surviving corporation in a merger) also include
conforming modifications. Id. §§ 171.153, .1531.
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tion under section 171.202(c) and makes the payments required under that
section by March 15.279
The legislature repealed the tax lien provisions of sections 171.356
through 171.360 effective August 26, 1985.280 Franchise taxes are now sub-
ject to the general lien provisions of chapter 113.281 A major difference be-
tween the two sets of rules is that section 171.360 had required the
comptroller to commence a suit to enforce a franchise tax lien against a
corporation within two years after the corporation forfeits its corporate priv-
ileges, 282 while section 113.105 provides that a state tax lien continues in
effect until the tax is paid.283
D. Franchise Tax Rules
The comptroller adopted several amendments to his franchise tax rules
during the Survey period. The comptroller proposed a new paragraph (b)(2)
to rule 3.391 specifying the books and records to be used in determining a
corporation's financial condition. 284  Amended rule 3.403(c)(18) provides
that the comptroller will consider a foreign corporation's share of gross re-
ceipts from a joint venture to be Texas receipts if the partnership or joint
venture has its principal place of business in Texas.285 Rule 3.410, effective
February 25, 1985, sets forth procedures for obtaining an extension for filing
an annual report.286 New rule 3.411 provides rules for application of the
franchise tax to banking corporations. 287 The comptroller will allocate divi-
dends and interest received by a bank to the commercial domicile of the
bank.288 The new rule requires banks to file a supplemental report showing
the allocation of franchise tax for taxing units in which the bank's principal
office is located.289  New rule 3.412 provides guidelines for reporting
franchise tax by a corporation that is the survivor of a merger occurring
after August 25, 1985.290
279. Id. § 171.362(e).
280. Act of Jan. 8, 1985, ch. 37, § 3, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 128 (Vernon).
281. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 113.002-.008, .010-.104, .106-.206 (Vernon 1982) and
§§ 113.001, .009, .105 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
282. Id. § 171.360.
283. Id. § 113.105 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
284. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 10 Tex. Reg. 238 (1985). These records consist
of the general ledger and special journals of original entry.
285. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.403(c)(18), [1 TEX.] ST. TAX REP.
(CCH) 14-061, at 1023 (Aug. 4, 1985).
286. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.410 [1 Tex] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 14-
094, at 1042 (Feb. 25, 1985).
287. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.411, [1 TEX] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 14-
097, at 1043 (Feb. 20, 1985).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 3.412, [1 TEX] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 14-





In Bullock v. Mid-American Oil & Gas, Inc. 291 the Austin court of appeals
held that the taxpayer must determine the market value of gas produced at
the mouth of the well by the contract of sale between the producer and the
first purchaser of the gas. 29 2 This method of determination applies even
though the purchaser is closely related to the producer.293 A subsidiary of
Mid-American purchased the gas under a long-term contract from an unre-
lated joint venture. Mid-American later purchased a majority interest in the
joint venture and sold the gas to third parties at a much higher price than its
original contract price. The comptroller attempted to assess the severance
tax on the basis of the price that Mid-American sold the gas to the third
parties. The court, however, stated that the severance tax is imposed upon
the market value of gas produced and saved in Texas by the producer;294 and
the value of the gas at the mouth of the well constitutes the market value.295
The court held that the contracts of sale between a producer and a purchaser
determine the market value of the gas provided that the contract is an arms-
length transaction, free from fraud or collusion. 296
Two appellate courts reached opposite conclusions on whether a bank
could enjoin assessment of tax on bank shares after the United States
Supreme Court had declared the method of assessing the tax unconstitu-
tional. 297 In American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County298 the Dallas
court of appeals required the taxpayers to establish that the bank shares'
value determined under the illegal formula caused substantial injury.299 The
court held that the Texas Supreme Court had established this prerequisite in
City of Arlington v. Cannon;3°° in which the court stated: "to obtain relief
from taxes arrived at through the use of an arbitrary, illegal and fundamen-
tally erroneous plan of valuation, the taxpayer must show substantial in-
jury."'3°' The court of appeals thus refused to enjoin assessment of the tax,
although the court did recognize that the United States Supreme Court has
held the equity capital formula used in computing the bank shares tax un-
constitutional to the extent that the formula takes into consideration the
value of government obligations held by banks.30 2 In a dissenting opinion
one justice reasoned that the taxpayers had established substantial injury suf-
291. 680 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
292. Id. at 616.
293. Id. at 617.
294. Id.; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 201.052(a) (Vernon 1982).
295. 680 S.W.2d at 616; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 201.101 (Vernon 1982).
296. 680 S.W.2d at 616; see W.R. Davis, Inc. v. State, 142 Tex. 637, 644, 180 S.W.2d 429,
432 (1944); Calvert v. Union Producing Co., 402 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1966, writ refd n.r.e.).
297. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855 (1983).
298. 679 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
299. Id. at 572-73.
300. 153 Tex. 566, 571, 271 S.W.2d 414, 417 (1954).
301. 271 S.W.2d at 417.
302. 679 S.W.2d at 575.
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ficient to authorize injunctive relief merely by showing the unconstitutional-
ity of the assessment made on the bank shares. 30 3
In Charles Schreiner Bank v. Kerrville Independent School District3°4 the
San Antonio court of appeals held that taxpayers are not required to estab-
lish substantial injury when the taxing scheme is unlawful. 30 5 The court
noted that no prior court had given a precise definition to substantial injury,
although cases indicate that the taxpayer must show that the assessment of
his property results in taxation of a substantially higher percentage of its
market value than the percentage used for other property. 30 6 The court then
considered alternate methods for valuing the bank shares that might be legal
and concluded that any alternate method would necessarily include a con-
sideration of the government obligations held by the bank.30 7 The court also
concluded that imposition of the substantial injury requirement would place
an impossible burden on the taxpayer to establish the market value of the
shares and to show that the assessor taxed the bank shares at a higher per-
centage of market value than other property.30 8 The court ruled that when
the taxing scheme is unlawful and fundamentally wrong, courts should not
apply the substantial injury requirement to preclude an injunction against
assessment of tax.30 9
B. Legislation
The legislature amended various sections of the motor rule tax under
chapter 153 to increase the exemption for gasoline or diesel fuel transported
into Texas in the fuel tank of a motor vehicle. 310 The legislature also
amended section 153.210 to add a new category of vehicles subject to the
pre-paid user permit: Class E for vehicles weighing 7001 pounds to
10,000.3 1 1
The legislature also made a number of amendments to chapters 154 and
155, cigarette and tobacco taxes, that take effect March 1, 1986. Amend-
ments to section 154.058 exempt retail dealers from the inventory tax im-
posed by that section after a tax increase. 312 The legislature has eliminated
the requirement that retail dealers obtain permits for the sale of cigarettes,
cigars, or tobacco products. 313 Solicitors are also exempt from obtaining the
303. Id. at 675 (Rowe, J., dissenting).
304. 683 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
305. Id. at 471.
306. Id. at 469; see City of Arlington v. Cannon, 153 Tex. 566, 571-72, 271 S.W.2d 414,
417 (1954); State v. Whittenburg, 153 Tex. 205, 214, 265 S.W.2d 569, 573 (1954).
307. 683 S.W.2d at 469.
308. Id. at 470-71.
309. Id. at 471.
310. These amendments appear in TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 153.104, .108, .109, .206,
.211, .212, .220 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
311. Id. § 151.210.
312. Id. § 154.058.
313. Act of Jan. 8, 1985, ch. 58, §§ 4, 8, 23, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 197, 200-10
(Vernon). This act repealed section 154.102 of the Tax Code and amended sections 154.111
(cigarette tax) and 155.041 (cigars and tobacco products). See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§§ 154.102, .111 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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cigarette tax permit or paying annual permit fees, but solicitors must obtain
permits for cigar and tobacco products. 3 14 The statute no longer requires
distributors of cigarettes and other tobacco products to make daily reports of
deliveries. 3 15 The legislature also repealed certain requirements applicable
to distributors, wholesale dealers, and retailers who sell tobacco products
from vending machines, trains, boats, and airplanes. 316 The legislature re-
pealed numerous provisions of chapters 154 and 155 as unnecessary and pro-
vided that the general provisions of chapters 111 and 113 will apply to
tobacco taxes. The repealed statutes include provisions governing tax
lien, 317 confidential information, 318 and admissibility of certain reports in
evidence in tax proceedings. 3 19
The legislature also made a number of changes in statutes governing ad-
ministration of state taxes. Amendments to sections 113.001 and 113.105
provide the state with a lien for state taxes on after-acquired property, as
well as property the taxpayer owns at the time the state files the lien. 320
New paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 111.011 authorize the attorney gen-
eral to seek an injunction to prohibit a person from continuing a business
when the business collects or withholds more tax than the law authorizes. 32 1
The same remedy is available when the business collects or withholds tax
under a false claim. 322 A new section 111.0081 establishes the date payment
becomes due and payable after a deficiency determination. 323 The legisla-
ture added new provisions to chapter 111 to authorize the comptroller to
refuse to issue or renew a permit or license to any person who is in violation
of any other state permit or licensing permit or to any person delinquent in
314. Act of Jan. 8, 1985, ch. 58, §§ 21, 27, 39, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 197, 207-13
(Vernon); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 155.049, .112, .001, .042 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
315. Act of Jan. 8, 1985, ch. 58, §§ 16, 18, 20, 40, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 197, 205-06
(Vernon). This act repealed sections 154.212 (cigarette tax) and 155.113 (cigar and tobacco
products) of the Tax Code and adopted conforming changes in sections 154.501 and 154.516.
See Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§ 154.212, .501, .516, 155.113 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
316. Act of Jan. 8, 1985, ch. 58, §§ 29, 30, 31, 37, 38, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 197, 211-
13 (Vernon). See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 155.056, .110(b), .053, .057, .109 (Vernon Supp.
1986).
317. Act of Jan. 8, 1985, ch. 58, § 45, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 197, 215 (Vernon). This
act repealed sections 154.413 and 154.414 (tax liens for cigarette taxes) and 155.153 and
155.154 (tax liens for cigar and tobacco products). These taxes are secured by liens under the
general administrative provisions of TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 113.001 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
318. Act of Jan. 8, 1985. ch. 58, § 44, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 197, 215 (Vernon). This
act repealed sections 154.308, 154.521, and 155.185. Information obtained by the attorney
general or comptroller from taxpayer documents will remain confidential under TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 111.006 (Vernon 1982).
319. Act of Jan. 8, 1985, ch. 58, § 46, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 197, 215 (Vernon). This
act repealed sections 154.401, 154.402, 155.141, and 155.142. TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 111.014 (Vernon 1982) generally covers the admissability of evidence in tax proceedings.
320. Id. §§ 113.001, .105 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
321. Id. § 111.011(b). Before beginning an action for injunctive relief under Tax Code
§ 111.011, the attorney general must send written notice by certified mail requesting that the
person cease any wrongful collections, and allow fifteen days for compliance. Id. § 111.011 (c).
322. Id. § 111.011(b).
323. Id. § 111.0081. If the taxpayer does not request a redetermination hearing, the tax
will become due and payable ten days after it becomes final. Id. If a redetermination hearing
occurs, the tax will be due twenty days after the comptroller's decision. Id. The comptroller
will add a ten percent penalty if the taxpayer does not pay the tax when due. Id.
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paying any state tax. 324 Finally, the legislature amended section 112.060(c)
to permit payment of tax refunds from general revenue funds of the state
provided insufficient funds exist in the state's expense account. 3 2 5
The legislature has also amended section 182.083 of the gross receipts tax
to revise the reporting requirements for a business that changes form during
a reporting period. 326 The legislature also amended the premium receipts
tax under article 1.14-1 of the Insurance Code to require corporations cov-
ered by insurance issued by companies not authorized to transact business in
Texas to report the amount of taxes due and payable to Texas directly to the
State Board of Insurance, rather than including the information in the
franchise tax reports.3 2 7
324. See id. §§ 111.0047, .0048, .0049. Section 111.0049 allows a taxpayer to appeal such a
decision in the same manner as an appeal from a final deficiency determination. Id.
325. See id. § 112.060(c).
326. See id. § 182.083. The report of gross receipts submitted under section 182.081 to the
comptroller must show the combined gross receipts of the two corporations. The taxpayer
must pay taxes on the combined gross receipts. Id.
327. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.14-1, § 12A (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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